

# Letters from

BY LEONARD MOSLEY

For the first time, Soviet agent Kim Philby tells about his friends in the C.I.A.—the ones he double-crossed

**I** have met quite a few top intelligence agents during a lifetime as a foreign correspondent, but Kim Philby is the only one who never gave away to anyone except his paymasters that he was a double agent.

I have been with him when he got drunk with groups of British and American newspapermen in Cairo, Istanbul, Beirut and Damascus—and by drunk I mean well and truly sloshed—but never once did he give us a hint or arouse even a suspicion that he was anything but a top-echelon, and particularly amiable, British spy working closely with his colleagues in American intelligence.

We never guessed that he was also turning the secrets of both Britain and its allies over to the Russians.

I haven't seen him since he skipped to Moscow in 1963, one jump ahead of his arrest for treason. But I decided to attempt to reestablish contact with him when I ran across his name in the Allen W. Dulles Papers at Princeton University. Allen Dulles was once director of the C.I.A., and I was writing the biography of him, his brother John Foster and his sister, Eleanor. I found a note from Allen in the papers referring affectionately to a dinner outing with "my friend Kim."

How well had they really known each other? When did Allen Dulles find out that his charming British colleague was a Russian spy and was in Washington chiefly to sabotage the plans of the C.I.A.? And what did Kim Philby think of Allen Dulles?

The letters below provide the answers to some of my questions, and they represent the first statements Kim Philby has made about himself and his former colleagues since he defected. How he was persuaded to break his silence is a long and complicated story, and I am pledged to reveal only part of it.

But first some details of Philby's career and the reasons why American and

British intelligence experts still believe him to be the most important Soviet spy ever to infiltrate their top committees and covert-action units in Washington and London.

Son of the famous Arabist and explorer Harry St. John Philby, H.A.R. "Kim" Philby was a young student at Cambridge, England, in the Thirties when he was recruited into the Communist party. Almost at once he displayed qualities that were recognized as prime material for a good agent by officers of the Soviet K.G.B., and he was instructed to go underground and never again reveal his pro-Red sympathies.

He began posing as a right-wing sympathizer with Fascist causes, went to Spain on the Franco side during the bloody civil war, and later joined the Anglo-German Fellowship, which advocated closer ties with Hitler in the months before World War II began.

Just before the war began, he used his old-boy contacts in London and Cambridge to get a job with the British S.I.S. (Special Intelligence Service), and his promotion was rapid. When war came, he was put in charge of the Iberian desk, covering neutral Spain and Portugal, and later, when British experts cracked the code used by the Abwehr, the Nazi intelligence service, he took control of all the decoded telegrams intercepted from Berlin.

After the end of World War II, Philby was sent to Washington as liaison chief between the S.I.S. and the C.I.A. He soon became a popular drinking companion with his colleagues in the Agency, but he believed the C.I.A.'s director, General Walter Bedell "Beetle" Smith, suspected him of being a Red spy.

In fact, it was the deputy director of the Agency, Allen Welsh Dulles, who was most suspicious of him. Dulles had been warned by one of his subordinates, James Jesus Angleton, who ran espionage and counterespionage at the C.I.A., that there was "something wrong" with Philby. On one occasion the acutely sensitive and perceptive Angleton accompanied Philby to Buckingham Palace in London, where the Briton was about to be made an Of-

ficer of the British Empire by King George VI for his services to British intelligence. Just as they entered the throne room for the awards ceremony, Philby looked at the king's servants in their elaborate regalia and remarked contemptuously: "You know, what this country could damn well do with is a dose of real socialism."

From that moment on, Angleton was convinced that Philby was a Red. He told Dulles: "Watch him. He could be dangerous to us."

Dulles didn't take him seriously at first and lived to regret it. It was Philby—who sat in on meetings of the C.I.A. covert-operations committee in Washington—who delivered plans to Moscow of the Anglo-American operation against Albania aimed at toppling the Communist regime there in 1951. When an Anglo-American force moved over the Albanian frontier from Greece, troops flown in from the U.S.S.R. were waiting for them. Two hundred of the force of four hundred were killed and a hundred captured and executed in Tirana, the Albanian capital.

From then on, Allen Dulles was onto Philby. Thanks to some bungling at the C.I.A., he never did get the goods on him, however—not enough, at least, to justify having him arrested and charged with espionage. And Philby, aware that the heat was on, warned two of his closest collaborators, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, that the law was closing in on them and got them away to Moscow. He stayed on to bluff it out.

Dulles did persuade Bedell Smith, however, to have Philby kicked out of the United States, and he was sent back to London, where, glib and resourceful as usual, he succeeded in talking his way out of merciless investigation.

It was not until 1963 that the British got enough evidence to justify Kim Philby's arrest, but he still had friends in the S.I.S. network and they tipped him off that the net was closing in. He took off for Moscow, taking with him Rosie Brewer, wife of Sam Brewer of The New York Times—supposedly one of Philby's friends and colleagues. Rosie subsequently became Philby's second wife,

STATINTL

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A 9

11 March 1978

TRB

# The state of the Soviet Union

At two o'clock on Nov. 13, 1959, CIA Director Allen Dulles, appearing before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, presented a frightening statement about the Russian economy which I have before me as I write. He warned that Soviet industrial production had been growing "at a rate at least twice that of the U.S. since 1950" and that "Soviet GNP has also been growing twice as rapidly."

It was chilling. Remember that two years before, Russia had startled America by putting up Sputnik.

We weren't ready for it. We regarded Russia as a large, backward agricultural dictatorship whose Marxist philosophy kept tripping up its industrial production.

The ebullient Nikita Khrushchev was uttering boasts about Soviet output that we couldn't take seriously. He told the Communist Party Congress in February 1959, for example, that the USSR "intends to outstrip the U.S. economically." We chuckled.

He put a date on it: After their current seven-year plan, he boasted, "we will probably need about five more years to catch up with and outstrip the U.S. industrial output." By that time (1970) "or perhaps even sooner," he said, "the Soviet Union will advance to first place in the world both in absolute volume of production and in per capita production."

It was silly but it was scary, too. And now here was Allen Dulles' testimony.

General Eisenhower was president. By playing cat

and mouse with the U.S. economy — whenever recovery developed he slapped on the anti-inflationary brakes — he kept prices under control, but also produced three recessions in eight years... a record. Khrushchev believed, or pretended to believe, that America's growth rate would stumble along at 2 per cent. Dulles told us at this point that Russia's was booming at 7.7 per cent, or 10 per cent if you included military production.

*TRB is the traditional signature on a column appearing weekly in The New Republic magazine, written by Richard L. Strout, Washington correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor.*

So now 1970 has come and gone. The Dulles scare was a false alarm. The technical gap between the U.S.A. and the USSR is big and it is one of the most important things in the world today; it is more important in the long run, probably, than subs and nuclear bombs because the supply of subs and nuclear bombs ultimately depends on overall national output.

The economic gap will continue in our favor unless we have a failure of national will, as we did in Eisenhower's day when we let our GNP lag, as we have in the past four years in our unwillingness to write an energy bill or as we may be doing again now when we accept inflation, unemployment, a wobbling dollar, a colossal trade deficit and the prospect of a recession stemming from a coal blackout.

Russia has come a long way industrially in 20 years, but it has a long way to go. Yale University has a new symposium, "The Technological Level of Soviet Industry," which notes that "in most of the technologies studied no substantial diminution of the technological gap between the Soviet Union and the West has occurred." The chemical industry "had to import two-thirds of its new plant in the 1960s from the West."

What course will they follow when ailing Leonid Brezhnev goes?

For a capitalist country like the U.S., writhing in unemployment, inflation, a \$25 billion trade deficit and now a basic coal strike, to dwell on the economic problems of Russia seems ironic. Yet they are there just the same and, ultimately, the load they put on the peasants and workers may do more than the SALT talks to reduce armaments.

Harvard's Russian Research Center has studied the Soviets' current five-year plan (1976-1981) and finds that agriculture and the oil industry are holding their economy back. Grain output and fertilizer lag behind targets. Russia is the world's biggest crude oil producer but her conveniently located wells are tapering off and the new ones are beyond the Urals, which in relative terms is like saying in Alaska.

The CIA makes comparisons as in Allen Dulles' day. Its report last July shows the septuagenarian Soviet leadership facing the hardest kind of choices. They want to catch up with us militarily, they want to expand their industrial base and they must meet minimal consumer expectations.

They suffer four handicaps which, the CIA says, are causing a slowdown in growth: a decline in the labor force from reduced birth rates; declining growth of capital productivity; an undependable agriculture caused by harsh climate and Marxist production methods; and a limited capacity to earn hard currency to buy needed technology and machines abroad.

Using United Nations figures of 30 countries selected to compare living standards of free and controlled economies, the Soviets are sixth from the bottom, the U.S. third from the top (preceded by Switzerland and Sweden). Per capita GNP for the U.S. is \$7,894; for Russia, \$2,739. The cost of being a military superpower puts a terrible burden on the Russian people: In absolute terms they spend about \$1.40 for defense for each \$1 spent by the U.S., according to one estimate.

In one thing Russia has almost caught up with the U.S., and that is in the physical "Quality of Life" index — life expectancy, literacy and infant mortality. America's figure is 94; the Soviets are just under us at 91.

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 1-9

THE WASHINGTON STAR  
4 March 1978

Q and A

## A Dulles Retort To an Author's Critical Portrait

Eleanor Dulles, for many years a State Department official concerned with economic affairs in Germany and Austria, has been portrayed as part of a triumvirate collaborating with her brothers, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and CIA chief Allen Dulles, to run American foreign policy in the Cold War period. She was interviewed by Washington Star Staff Writer Anne Crutcher.

Question: You and your brothers and the period of history when all of you were most active have been the subject of considerable analysis and controversy lately. In particular, there's the new book by Leonard Mosley, showing you and the two of them as a team setting the course of American foreign relations at the height of the Cold War. Do you feel you have been accurately represented?

Dulles: No I don't feel I have. And in some cases, what I've done has been exaggerated in its importance. I feel that what I did for Austria and Berlin was very important — both to the countries and the people.

Q: But overinflated in the telling?

A: Yes. I was close to Willy Brandt, but I was never as buddy-buddy with (Konrad) Adenauer as Mosley shows me to have been. I did have some leverage and effectiveness in dealing with certain countries, but overall foreign policy I was never able to influence.

Q: Not even through your relationships with your brothers?

A: I did my job as separately and independently as anyone else who was not related to them. They did not consult me except where it concerned

the specific things I did — which were related to postwar reconstruction for the most part.

Q: The Mosley book certainly suggests otherwise.

A: Mosley occasionally quotes me correctly. He also misrepresents what I said to him in many long interviews.

Q: Would you differentiate between mistakes of interpretation and mistakes of fact in this book?

A: Yes. There are some of both. The writer must, of course, express his own views. But when he gets the wrong year and the wrong participants and the wrong place, it makes the validity of everything he says questionable.

Q: You find many factual errors in this book, I take it?

A: Hundreds. Counting the inconsequential ones, perhaps as many as 900. As for misinterpretations, one is the political attitudes of my brother Allen, my brother Foster and me. Although I didn't support everything Franklin Roosevelt did, I worked for the New Deal. I was never active for (Thomas) Dewey or Wendell Willkie.

Q: You were actually a Democrat?

A: I come as close to being an independent as

anybody can be. I have sometimes registered as a Republican. But I voted Democratic probably more often in presidential elections than I did Republican.

Foster didn't really consider himself a political man. He did not take very kindly to politics as narrowly defined. He was interested in world affairs.

Q: You feel Mosley misunderstood his political outlook?

A: Yes. His book gives a wrong impression of Foster's outlook on the postwar world. For one thing it talks about his favoring world government. I don't say that he wouldn't have liked world government under ideal circumstances. But he never favored the movements that were called world government. He thought that it was important to reconstruct the nations and to bring about reconciliation between nations. He was particularly concerned with integration in Europe. One thing in the book that disturbs me is its interpretation of Foster's attitude towards Germany. It says he was more set on destroying postwar Germany than Henry Morgenthau, who wanted to strip it of industry and make it an agricultural country. Mosley says Foster wanted to fragment Germany. What he really wanted was to see a European integration with a federated Germany.

Q: What about Foster's connection with the Bay of Pigs as described in this book?

A: It's rather absurd and I don't quite know why the book makes this mistake. But it says he conferred with the president about the Bay of Pigs project. Well, (Fidel) Castro didn't come to power until the time that Foster was dying. In fact he was dead when Castro really had a firm position in Cuba. And he never had anything to do with the Bay of Pigs project.

Q: What about the presentations of Foster's personality that have been cropping up?

A: Although he was actually a person who liked good food and drink and pleasant company, he was stereotyped in the less perceptive newspapers as rigid and stiff and Calvinistic. And anti-Semitic. I have many reasons for finding that disturbing.

Q: What about that?

A: Well you see I married a man who was a Jewish scholar and very much interested in the Jewish tradition. This is misrepresented in the book and my brother's attitude toward it and my father's attitude toward it is completely misstated. My family did not oppose my wedding. The author says that nobody from the family was present at my wedding. That is not true. It was in my aunt's house and several of the family were present — it